# ASU Cards Round Quarters Gonzaga

## 1AC

#### Same 1AC as Octas.

## 2AC

### Solvency

#### No circumvention – the President would use the NSC

Harvey Rishikof 8, Professor of Law and Former Chair of the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College and Kevin E Lunday, Captain and judge advocate in the US Coast Guard, "Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court", December 19, www.cwsl.edu/content/journals/Rishikof.pdf

The primary triggering mechanism for establishing NSC jurisdiction would fall within the discretion and control of the Attorney General. Through certification and charging provisions, the Attorney General could invoke NSC jurisdiction by certifying that persons in custody inside the United States are suspected of terrorist activity, or by charging persons in custody outside the United States with one or more specific terrorism offenses. However, the NSC would provide the government with a preferred venue to manage terrorism cases and proceedings, reducing the risk of the NSC being sidelined like the current ATRC.102 Further, the NSC could review challenges to the executive certification or charging decisions,103 transferring those cases in which the government has improperly attempted to employ the NSC for non-terrorism cases to the appropriate district court. This review power will reduce government incentives to dress up any case in terrorism clothing to obtain the advantages of the NSC procedures. The review power would not prevent the government from pursuing a terrorism matter in district court instead of the NSC. However, even without an executive action triggering NSC jurisdiction, if a district court determines that it is unable to adequately manage a terrorism case, it would be permitted to sua sponte transfer the case to NSC jurisdiction

### Judicial Activism

**Balance of power theory is historically accurate – understanding cooperation is key.**

Blumenthal ’10 **(Daniel, Resident Fellow and the Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, where his research focuses on the national security implications of U.S.-China relations. Previously, he was senior Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the secretary of Defense’s Office of International Security Affairs, Sino-U.S. Competition and U.S. Security: How Do We Assess the Military Balance? December 2010, The National Bureau of Asian Research)**

Why Study a Sino-U.S. Military Balance?

Since the end of the Cold War, a broad consensus has emerged among policymakers and analysts that Asia is becoming the center of power in world affairs. As Asia’s prominence grows, so do U.S. interests in the region. Scholars and policymakers all agree that both the manner in which China becomes a great power and the way it exercises power is central to Asia’s future. At the same time, many have recognized that **China’s growing military capabilities could disrupt the region’s ongoing peaceful transformation.** Thus, U.S. policy has been based on two broad impulses. **Washington seeks cooperative relations** to integrate China into the international system, **and** it **has sought to hedge against or balance China’s growing military might.** Sino-U.S. **relations are** thus **characterized by elements of cooperation and competition, which U.S. policy must balance.** While this may be counterintuitive, **if the U**nited **S**tates **maintains a favorable balance of power,** it is more likely to have cooperative relations with Beijing. The United States can only compete, however, if it knows over what it is competing. This in turn requires an understanding of the dynamic Sino-U.S. military balance. **A clearer picture of how U.S. military forces measure up against China’s should be the basis for a sound policy.** **Knowledge of the military balance can help policymakers with both the cooperative and the competitive elements** of the relationship with China. 2 On the competitive side, presidents and their **advisors can better assess how to adjust the U.S. force posture to balance China’s growing power and reassure allies that China will not dominate Asia.** In doing so, they can help the world’s most rapidly growing region avoid costly, perhaps even uncontrollable (and nuclear), arms races and conflicts. On the cooperative side, **a sense of where the country stands in a competition with China could help U.S. leaders decide when to accommodate Beijing in ways that would not harm national security. Once we know what really matters, in all likelihood, we will be less worried about some Chinese capabilities.** **Policymakers** and analysts **can learn from** the ways in which the United States successfully engaged in **past security competitions**. **The Cold War competition** with the Soviet Union, for example, preoccupied successive presidents, who were attentive to military balances in a range of possible contingencies and scenarios. Mercifully, **competition never led to an outright soviet-U.S. conflict**—perhaps **because the U**nited **S**tates **did** its part to **deter aggression and reassure its allies**.

#### EFFORTS TO FIND A RADICAL THIRD OPTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM GENERATES A PATERNALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER AND TIES THE HANDS OF THE UNITED STATES PREVENTING ACTION TO STOP GENOCIDE, TERRORISM, SEXISM AND OTHER ATROCITIES.

Hanson 4 (Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, City Journal, Spring, City Journal, Spring, http://www.city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html)

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers’ paradise—not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism’s demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas.” From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini “a kind of mystic saint” who would usher in a new “political spirituality” that would “transfigure” the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (“to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”), there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension—all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. There was victim status for everybody, from gender, race, and class at home to colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony abroad. Anyone could play in these “area studies” that cobbled together the barrio, the West Bank, and the “freedom fighter” into some sloppy global union of the oppressed—a far hipper enterprise than rehashing Das Kapital or listening to a six-hour harangue from Fidel. Of course, pampered Western intellectuals since Diderot have always dreamed up a “noble savage,” who lived in harmony with nature precisely because of his distance from the corruption of Western civilization. But now this fuzzy romanticism had an updated, political edge: the bearded killer and wild-eyed savage were not merely better than we because they lived apart in a pre-modern landscape. No: they had a right to strike back and kill modernizing Westerners who had intruded into and disrupted their better world—whether Jews on Temple Mount, women in Westernized dress in Teheran, Christian missionaries in Kabul, capitalist profiteers in Islamabad, whiskey-drinking oilmen in Riyadh, or miniskirted tourists in Cairo. An Ayatollah Khomeini who turned back the clock on female emancipation in Iran, who murdered non-Muslims, and who refashioned Iranian state policy to hunt down, torture, and kill liberals nevertheless seemed to liberal Western eyes as preferable to the Shah—a Western-supported anti-communist, after all, who was engaged in the messy, often corrupt task of bringing Iran from the tenth to the twentieth century, down the arduous, dangerous path that, as in Taiwan or South Korea, might eventually lead to a consensual, capitalist society like our own. Yet in the new world of utopian multiculturalism and knee-jerk anti-Americanism, in which a Noam Chomsky could proclaim Khomeini’s gulag to be “independent nationalism,” reasoned argument was futile. Indeed, how could critical debate arise for those “committed to social change,” when no universal standards were to be applied to those outside the West? Thanks to the doctrine of cultural relativism, “oppressed” peoples either could not be judged by our biased and “constructed” values (“false universals,” in Edward Said’s infamous term) or were seen as more pristine than ourselves, uncorrupted by the evils of Western capitalism.¶ Who were we to gainsay Khomeini’s butchery and oppression? We had no way of understanding the nuances of his new liberationist and “nationalist” Islam. Now back in the hands of indigenous peoples, Iran might offer the world an alternate path, a different “discourse” about how to organize a society that emphasized native values (of some sort) over mere profit. So at precisely the time of these increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, the silly gospel of multiculturalism insisted that Westerners have neither earned the right to censure others, nor do they possess the intellectual tools to make judgments about the relative value of different cultures. And if the initial wave of multiculturalist relativism among the elites—coupled with the age-old romantic forbearance for Third World roguery—explained tolerance for early unpunished attacks on Americans, its spread to our popular culture only encouraged more.¶ This nonjudgmentalism—essentially a form of nihilism—deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely “different” rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make “value judgments” about “other” peoples who are often “victims” of American “oppression.” Thus, before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed Atta’s promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration

### XO CP

#### Permutation do both.

#### Court Creation DA – The executive cannot create a national security court, only Congress is vested with this power.

Schuck, Lecturer at Yale Law School, ‘4

[Peter, “Terrorism Cases Demand New Hybrid Courts”, LA Times, 7-9-2004,

<http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/09/opinion/oe-schuck9>, RSR]

The Supreme Court in its recent rulings has given U.S. citizens who are captives in the war on terror, as well as noncitizen Guantanamo detainees, the right to hearings. Now comes the hard part: what kinds of hearings, in what courts, by what process?¶ The court wisely refrained from answering these questions in detail. Arguments on the specifics had not been presented to the court, and the limited guidance that the justices did offer was more intuitive than analytical. Wisdom aside, this sort of self-restraint is constitutionally required: Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14 gives Congress -- not the judicial or the executive branch -- the authority to make rules for the armed forces, including the initial design of hearings for the prisoners.

#### Rollback DA - Future presidents prevent solvency

Harvard Law Review 12,

["Developments in the Law: Presidential Authority," Vol. 125:2057, www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125\_devo.pdf]

The recent history of signing statements demonstrates how public opinion can effectively check presidential expansions of power by inducing executive self-binding. **It remains to be seen**, however, **if this more restrained view of signing statements can remain intact, for it relies on the promises of one branch — indeed of one person — to enforce and maintain the separation of powers**. To be sure, President **Obama’s guidelines for the use of signing statements contain all the hallmarks of good executive branch policy: transparency, accountability, and fidelity to constitutional limitations.** Yet, in practice**, this apparent constraint (**however well intentioned**) may amount to** little more than voluntary self-restraint. 146 Without a formal institutional check, it is unclear what mechanism will prevent the next President (or President Obama himself) from reverting to the allegedly abusive Bush-era practices. 147 Only time, and perhaps public opinion, will tell.

### Debt Ceiling DA

#### Case OW. They don’t read an impact to debt ceiling.

#### Inevitable government shutdown thumps the DA.

Politico 9/30 (http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/government-shutdown-john-boehner-pivotal-moment-97535\_Page2.html)

As of late Sunday, there were no negotiations occurring between Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and Obama. The Senate wasn’t even in session, and House GOP leaders weren’t holding emergency discussions internally. Both sides seem prepared to let the government shutdown happen and then squabble over who is to blame. The House will reconvene Monday at 10 a.m., but Republicans will just wait. The Senate is scheduled to return Monday afternoon, and Reid says Senate Democrats will move quickly then to reject two House amendments to the government funding bill. That would leave just hours before a government shutdown.¶ Boehner, who also faces in coming weeks an even more daunting battle with Obama and Reid over raising the $16.7 trillion debt ceiling, may need a shutdown now in order to reassert control over his members and cool their passion for a winner-takes-all showdown with Democrats.¶ (WATCH: Cruz: GOP 'scared' over shutdown)¶ Following Saturday’s late-night vote on a three-month $986 billion government funding bill that would delay Obamacare for a year, Boehner tried to shift blame for the looming shutdown onto Reid and Senate Democrats. House Republicans also pushed through a bill funding U.S. troops in the event of a shutdown, adopted a repeal of a tax on medical devices and approved a conscience clause postponing a government mandate that employers cover the cost of birth control in their health insurance plans.¶ (Also on POLITICO: Government shutdown impact: Mail, air travel, prisons)¶ Reid has already rejected the House GOP changes to the government funding bill, demanding that Boehner send him a “clean” funding bill. Reid refused to call the Senate back into session on Sunday. Boehner then used Reid’s inaction to bash Senate Democrats.¶ “If the Senate stalls until Monday afternoon instead of working today, it would be an act of breathtaking arrogance by the Senate Democratic leadership,” Boehner said in a statement released on Sunday. “They will be deliberately bringing the nation to the brink of a government shutdown for the sake of raising taxes on seniors’ pacemakers and children’s hearing aids and plowing ahead with the train wreck that is the president’s health care law. The American people will not stand for it.”¶ But Reid — backed by Obama — has refused to yield an inch. Reid and the White House won’t defund Obamacare or delay its implementation. A top Senate Democratic aide compared Boehner’s complaint about Senate inaction to “a tree falling in the woods. No one is hearing it. The American people know where the blame lays for a shutdown.”¶ And Obama is also expected to hit House Republicans hard on Monday, as he did several times last week, showing that the president’s bully pulpit is more powerful than any press blitz by congressional leaders.

#### Boehner can’t unite the GOP on the debt ceiling

Alberta 9-26 (Tim Alberta, leadership reporter for the National Journal, Republicans Not Sold on Boehner's Debt-Ceiling Plan, National Journal, 26 September 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/republicans-not-sold-on-boehner-s-debt-ceiling-plan-20130926, da 9-26-13) PC

Speaker John Boehner attempted Thursday morning to sell House Republicans on a debt-ceiling plan that would delay the implementation of Obamacare, jumpstart the Keystone Pipeline, and introduce other conservative reforms in hopes of uniting the GOP conference ahead of tough votes on the continuing resolution and debt-ceiling.¶ But reaction from members was mixed, at best.¶ "We shouldn't even be talking about the debt-ceiling until we get [the Senate] to vote on a good CR for America," fumed Rep. Louie Gohmert of Texas, who plans to vote against the debt-ceiling bill when it hits the floor, which could happen as soon as Friday.¶ Rep. Mo Brooks of Alabama said he was undecided on the debt-limit package, even though "it definitely has a lot of goodies in it." Brooks added: "It does not cut spending and does not solve the problem."¶ Asked if it could pass the House, Brooks replied, "In my judgment, no."¶ Others Republicans, though, were more optimistic. Rep. Tom Price of Georgia, who has been working with leadership to craft a comprehensive strategy to deal with the CR and debt-ceiling fights, said members seemed satisfied that Boehner's proposal meets the criteria they have long demanded for a debt-ceiling increase.¶ "It meets the Boehner Rule -- any increase is met by dollar-for-dollar decrease in spending as well as reforms," Price said. "It will delay Obamacare for a year. ... And it keeps the House moving in a direction where the Senate has to respond, which is important."¶ But does it have enough support to pass the House? "I think so, yeah," Price said.¶ Rep. Kevin Brady of Texas agreed, saying conservatives should rally behind the Boehner plan. "We should be unified in bringing this debt-ceiling proposal out of the House," said Brady, noting that the package includes "very strong, pro-growth policies that will help reduce the deficit."¶ Brady said of a potential floor vote Friday: "There should be more than 218."¶ The prospect of a quick floor vote, however, did not sit well with undecided Republicans like Rep. Jim Bridenstine of Oklahoma. "I'm looking forward to seeing what leadership puts on the table," he said. "I think there's a lot more to be discussed."¶ Rep. Randy Weber of Texas agreed: "I have decided not take a position as of yet," he said. "I want to hear more."¶ Meanwhile, conservative leaders wouldn't bite when asked whether the debt-ceiling proposal has the votes to pass.¶ "You must confuse me with the whip," said a smiling Rep. Jeb Hensarling of Texas. Pressed to analyze the support within his conference for Boehner's plan, Hensarling repeated three times: "I expect Republicans to be united."¶ Even Rep. Steve Scalise, chairman of the Republican Study Committee, seemed uncertain of whether Boehner's presentation had won over a sufficient number of conservatives. "We're going to find out," he said. "You'll have to ask the whip."

#### Debt ceiling downgrade won’t hurt the economy---empirics

Brian Dooley 12, "Will US debt rating be downgraded again?", 12/29, [www.royalgazette.com/article/20121229/BUSINESS08/712299981](http://www.royalgazette.com/article/20121229/BUSINESS08/712299981)

So what happens when the world’s largest bond sector faces a potential downgrade due to political instability, runaway budget deficits and an anaemic economic recovery?¶ The answer might be found in what was witnessed last year at the time of the S&P downgrade, which also involved longer term US securities being placed on “negative watch”. S&P said they believed “the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed fell short of what is necessary to stabilise the government’s medium term debt dynamics”. The downgrade was prompted by the debt ceiling debate which requires Congress to approve increases in America’s debt capacity at regular intervals.¶ S&P argued that the predictability and effectiveness of American policymaking had both declined to a level of concern and cited pessimism that Congress and the Administration could bridge the vast gulf between the two main political parties. In short, the agency took a “show me” attitude about America being able to hammer out an effective plan which put the country back on track.¶ Oddly enough, Treasury bond prices had actually been increasing in the midst of the debt ceiling debate in the summer of 2011 as investors grew sanguine about the prospects for a successful budget negotiation. Prices rose and yields fell right up until the day of the downgrade after which bonds sold off sharply. On that day, the benchmark ten-year US Treasury bond yield ticked up to from 2.47 percent to 2.58 percent and prices of bonds declined across the curve.¶ Immediately after the S&P downgrade, however, investors shrugged off the news and Treasury bonds resumed their rally into the end of the year. Perhaps bond buyers were encouraged that an agreement had finally been struck and that Moody’s and Fitch, the two other major credit rating agencies had not followed the S&P action. Massive bond buying the US Federal Reserve didn’t hurt either.

### Security K

#### Our interpretation is that debate should be a question of the aff plan versus a competitive policy option.

#### This is key to ground and predictability – infinite number of possible kritik alternatives or things the negative could reject explodes the research burden. That’s a voting issue.

#### State-centrism is the only way to produce human security and limit everyday injustice – material change should be preferred

-alternatives to the state will not be democratically accountable – can’t give content to rights claims

-key to value to life

McCormack, Lecturer in IR at the University of Leicester, ‘10

[Tara, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, 10, “Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches”, pg. 140-142]

Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can give real content to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives. Critical theorists who argue for more cosmopolitan international frameworks of universal human rights or more global democratic organisations in order to emancipate the oppressed fail to understand that in the current political context they are arguing for fictional rights and communities. In this context, these rights can only be given at the behest of a more powerful state or international organisation. This, however, leads to a relationship between the rights recipient and the rights giver which is not a political relationship of control and accountability, but one closer, as Emma Rothschild has perceptively argued, to charity (Rothschild, 1995). In order to illustrate this problem from another angle, let us consider briefly the concept of Children’s Rights (this example is taken from Norman Lewis, 1998) or gender inequality. Without a doubt in many parts of the world children and women suffer greatly and have many unfair burdens upon them. It may seem therefore that the UN Convention on Children’s Rights, for example, or a framework of universal human rights codified in international law might be seen as a good and progressive thing in order to decrease inequality and empower women and children. Certainly for many critical and emancipatory theorists, as we have seen, the emerging rights regime is part of a potentially more just world order. However, as James Heartfield (1996) has argued, this is to understand that rights are a purely legal matter, rather than a product of prior social and political struggle which is then given legal form. Rights derive from subjects who are capable of exercising them and giving content to them (Heartfield, 1996; Lewis, 1998). Without the social and political struggle and the development of the rights-bearing individual who gives the legal rights their content, rights are fictions. Of course in reality a person in Britain (for example) does not directly exercise his or her rights, rather they are enforced by the existing state. If, for example, a women is denied employment because of her gender this infringes her rights. These rights are codified in state law. She may then go to court in order to force the company to abide by the law and her rights will be upheld. This is not, however, simply an esoteric point for political theorists but one with major implications for people. If we return to the example of the UN Convention on Children’s Rights we can begin to see what the problematic implications of rights without content are. Children’s rights cannot be exercised by children, they do not have the capacity, they are dependent upon other people in order to survive. Their rights are fictions which must be exercised on behalf of them (Lewis, 1998: 93). In reality this means that the state, for example, is empowered here, not the child. In the broader context of contemporary international relations it tends to mean that the developing country in which children’s rights are seen to be lacking (for example a country in which child labour is common) is subject to greater intervention and regulation from a more ‘enlightened’ international community. This also has the effect of turning what are essentially consequences of serious poverty and a low level of development into problems of law and morality. Again, more powerful ‘enlightened’ states are empowered to intervene and regulate developing states in the name of international law and human rights (Lewis, 1998: 95–98). As the problems, however, are not matters of law but of development they cannot be resolved through law. Not only is state sovereignty eroded but the idea of law also. We could also consider the problem of gender inequality in a developing state. A woman in Afghanistan, for example, clearly does not have the civil rights that a woman in another state might have. Yet of course, these are rights that she cannot claim against the government of her state, or rather the government cannot give content to these rights as the government’s control in the case of Afghanistan does not go much further than Kabul. Rather, the only way in which there may be a way for her to have these rights would be through the intervention of another state (indeed women’s rights formed part of the rationale for the military intervention in Afghanistan) whether military or tied to aid. Here, there will be no political relationship between the Afghan woman and, for example, NATO. There will be no mechanism of control and accountability for the woman, her rights are in the gift of power external forces and therefore not rights that can empower as they are not controlled by her. Friedrich Kratochwil argues that critical theory has to address ‘what types of constitutive understanding authorise particular practices and this creates specific types of authority’ (2007: 36). I argue that critical and emancipatory approaches have a certain unrealised constitutive understanding which is abstract and idealised, leading ultimately to forms of power and political practice that are disempowering. Critical theorists separate the rights bearer from the rights claimant. In the absence of any constitutive body that can give content to those rights or even agreed norms that can derive from that political body, these rights are at best meaningless and at worst empower precisely those practices which critical theorists wish to resolve. It is in this respect that in contemporary context critical and emancipatory approaches reproduce and authorise the constitutive particular practices of contemporary powers.

#### This means that the role of the ballot should be positing the judge as a policymaker. Policymakers should evaluate the goodness of ideas according to the consequentialist reduction of human suffering.

Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring 2002, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2

Politics is about ends and means--about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics. The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx's vision of the "riddle of history solved" and Engels's vision of the "withering away of the state" were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, and Antonio Gramsci--and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies. What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left--by which I mean "progressive" faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates--has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing--about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq--continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it--about globalization and sweatshops--is new and in some ways promising (see my "Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement," Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic--petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. BUT WHAT IS absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of "anti-imperialism" speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states--including most workers and the poor--value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jurgen Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism": a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all-too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left's alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that "the United States Government is the world's greatest terror organization," and suggest that "homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government" engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any "disloyalty." Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The "peace" demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks--in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role--were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers' lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn't really happened. Whatever one thinks about America's deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of "solidarity" with certain oppressed groups--Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans--and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. A CASE IN POINT is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: "Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law." This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9-11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: "vengeance offers no relief... retaliation can never guarantee healing... and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice." On this view military action of any kind is figured as "aggression" or "vengeance"; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, "healing" is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response--or at least any U.S. military response--is simply defined as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of any military response. It is virtually impossible either to "apprehend" and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the "criminals" in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to "arrest" them. And, finally, while "healing" is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a political goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for "social justice abroad." It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility--these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter--the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America's use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare--which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation--make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left's reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of "materialism" and evocations of "struggle," especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable "anti-militarism" of today's campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post-cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post-September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power.

#### Perm do both

#### Critiquing existing security structures isn’t enough – political action is necessary and the perm solves

Bilgin 2005 (Pinar, Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara “Regional Security in the Middle East” p. 60-1)

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice.

#### We have an ontological defense of the way we view international relations - game-theory proves that liberal internationalism emphasizes cooperation in protection of global goods.

Recchia and Doyle, ‘11

[Stefano (Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Cambridge) and Michael (Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University), “Liberalism in International Relations”, In: Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, eds., International Encyclopedia of Political Science (Sage, 2011), pp. 1434-1439, RSR]

Relying on new insights from game theory, ¶ scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized ¶ that so-called international regimes, consisting of ¶ agreed-on international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states effectively coordinate their policies and collaborate in ¶ the production of international public goods, such ¶ as free trade, arms control, and environmental ¶ protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade ¶ Organization (WTO) or North American Free ¶ Trade Agreement (NAFT A), regimes crucially ¶ improve the availability of information among ¶ states in a given issue area, thereby promoting ¶ reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs ¶ of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, ¶ institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus ¶ further advances international cooperation. ¶ Most international regime theorists accepted ¶ Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assurription of ¶ states as black boxes-that is, unitary and rational ¶ actors with given interests. Little or no attention ¶ was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. ¶ Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded ¶ the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states' ¶ interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed ¶ to preferences over strategies), thus engendering ¶ positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime ¶ theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the ¶ term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to ¶ identify it is somewhat misleading. ¶ It is only over the past decade or so that liberal ¶ international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship ¶ seeks to explain in particular the close interna tional ¶ cooperation among liberal democracies as well as ¶ higher-than-average levels of delegation b)' democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the ¶ \ ¶ Liberalism in International Relations 1437 ¶ European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty ¶ Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO ¶ (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & ¶ Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make ¶ liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about ¶ international cooperation are manifold: First, ¶ transnational actors such as nongovernmental ¶ organizations and private corporations thrive in ¶ liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate ¶ increased international cooperation; second, ¶ elected democratic officials rely on delegation to ¶ multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to ¶ commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal ¶ democracies, such as the United States and its ¶ allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex ¶ global governance arrangements to demonstrate ¶ strategic restraint and create incentives for other ¶ states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for ¶ maintaining international order. ¶ Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles ¶ Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the ¶ classical liberal intuition that formal international ¶ institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or ¶ NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated ¶ administrative structures and information-gathering ¶ capacities. In short, research on global governance ¶ and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and ¶ it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the ¶ democratic peace.

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

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The following section will briefly raise some questions about the **rejection of the old security framework** as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. **Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks**. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national **interest-based security framework** by major international institutions, **and the adoption of** ostensibly **emancipatory policies** and policy rhetoric, **has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a** more interventionary role, yet **without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. **Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework** there were at least formal and clear demarcations. **This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before**. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, **Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan**. **Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development**. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. **Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the** condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, **sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states**. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, **we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework**, which can be understood as **a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population** (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Torture exists in Guantanamo now – plan is key to solve that by closing Guantanamo.

Worthington 2013 (Andy, “From Guantánamo, Hunger Striker Abdelhadi Faraj Describes the Agony of Force-Feeding” July 18th. http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/torture/8320-from-guantanamo-hunger-striker-abdelhadi-faraj-describes-the-agony-of-force-feeding)

Although I’ve been very busy for the last few months with a steady stream of articles about Guantánamo and the ongoing hunger strike, I haven’t been able to keep track of everything that has been made available. In terms of publicity, this is an improvement on the years before the hunger strike reminded the world’s media about the ongoing existence of the prison, when stories about Guantánamo often slowed to the merest of trickles, and everyone involved in campaigning to close the prison and to represent the men still held there was, I think it is fair to say, becoming despondent and exhausted. However, it is also profoundly depressing that it took a prison-wide hunger strike to wake people up to the ongoing injustice of Guantánamo, where 86 cleared men are still held (cleared for release in January 2010 by President Obama’s inter-agency Guantánamo Review Task Force), and 80 others are, for the most part, held indefinitely without charge or trial. And it is just as depressing to note that, despite making a powerful speech eight weeks ago, and promising to resume releasing prisoners, President Obama has so far failed to release anyone. With Ramadan underway, there has been a slight dip in the total number of prisoners on the hunger strike — 80, according to the US military, down from 106, although there has been a slight increase in the number of prisoners being force-fed — from 45 to 46. Yesterday, a judge turned down a motion submitted on behalf of three prisoners — Shaker Aamer, the last British resident, and Ahmed Belbacha and Nabil Hadjarab, two Algerians — asking the court to order the government to stop force-feeding prisoners, and giving them medication without their consent, following a similar ruling last week in the case of another prisoner, Abu Wa’el Dhiab, a Syrian. All four are hunger strikers, and amongst the 86 men cleared for release but still held. In last week’s ruling, Judge Gladys Kessler (a Bill Clinton appointee) did not seem entirely happy that judges in the court of appeals had tied her hands regarding jurisdiction over the prisoners, because of a previous ruling in 2009. She also acknowledged that medical authorities describe force-feeding as torture, and made a point of telling President Obama that he has the authority and power to deal with the hunger strike, and the force-feeding, as Commander in Chief. Yesterday, however, Judge Rosemary Collyer (a George W. Bush appointee) had no interest in criticizing anyone but the prisoners and their lawyers. In her opinion, she wrote that, although the prisoners had framed their motion as one intended to stop force-feeding, their “real complaint is that the United States is not allowing them to commit suicide by starvation.” She added, “The right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments does not include a right to commit suicide and a right to assistance in doing so.” She also wrote that there was “nothing so shocking or inhumane in the treatment” that it could be regarded as raising a constitutional concern. In response, Jon Eisenberg, one of the prisoners’ lawyers, said Judge Collyer was wrong to claim that the prisoners were “demanding a right to commit suicide,” as the Associated Press described it. “She has misunderstood the purpose of the hunger strike. It’s not to commit suicide, it’s to protest indefinite detention,” Eisenberg said, adding that her opinion regarding force-feeding — that it was not “inhumane” — was not backed up by experts. “Human rights advocates, medical ethicists and religious leaders say otherwise,” he said. Judge Collyer’s ruling — and her dismissive attitude to the force-feeding — reminded me of a letter by Abdelhadi Faraj (aka Abdulhadi Faraj), another Syrian prisoner, which was published two weeks ago in the Huffington Post. Mr. Faraj (originally identified by the authorities as Abu Omar al-Hamawe) is one of the 86 men cleared for release but still held, and is in need of a new home because of the perilous situation in Syria. Moreover, he is one of four men captured together, who were all cleared for release, although only one of them was freed — a man named Maasoum Mouhammed, who was given a new home in Bulgaria in May 2010. He is also one of the hunger strikers, and, moreover, is one of the 46 men being force-fed.

#### Torture is a systematic oppression that kills agency and value to life. It’s a technique of perpetual dying.

**Wolfgang 1999** (German Philosopher, Anthropologist- professor at Universities of Gottingen & Erfurt. [Sofsky, "The endurance of impotence: The dynamics of persecutory violence," International Psychoanalysis Newsletter,)

The prisoners will be incarcerated or put into camps and, not rarely, are there subjected to torture. As a method of punitive and loyal justice, torture has a long prehistory which goes back to the early tyrannies. However, in the 20th century, torture has been systematized as a means of national persecution terror and been handed over to special units of the police, the military or the militia. Its executors have invented a multitude of new methods and have freed torture from the aims of finding the truth. Contrary to a widely held view, torture is not a means to extort confessions, information or proofs. Whatever may be declared the official aim, torture is not an instrument of interrogation, for the ultimate aim of torture is not to get the victim to talk but rather to silence him. The model of the duel, of a trial of strength of the will, is a bagatellization. Torture eliminates action and breaks the person through pain, panic and isolation. The victim is totally in the hands of the perpetrator and is at the mercy of his whims, rage, lust and destructive will. Any part of his body, any of his attitudes or stirrings can be used as a point of attack for the tormentors. Torture transforms the person into an organism, into a living piece of flesh. It tests physical reactions, generates pain and forces the tortured one to scream His insides are turned outwards, his language stifled in pain. The tortured person no longer experiences his body as a source of his own force for action. In the frenzy of pain, his own body itself becomes his enemy. It is his body which confronts him with the suffering from which he cannot escape, however much he grits his teeth. The mortal enemy is within himself, rages in his inside and destroys the final resistance. Torture is by no means restricted to external wounds. It splits the person through the centre into two parts. Since the victim's body becomes the accomplice of the torture, it destroys the somatic relation to himself and with it the foundation of his will, his speech, his soul, his psyche. Torture, therefore, is not a technique of killing but of perpetual dying. What torture is on a small scale, the concentration camp is on a large scale. It is not the sudden death which contains the meaning of this institution but the continuous presence of the torment. The camp is the central institution of persecutory terror in the 20th century. It serves the imprisonment of political enemies less than the transformation and extinction of those who are redundant. In the midst of society and set into a complex mesh of political and economical institutions, the concentration camp is a cosmos at the border of the social world, a universum of unparalleled destructivity

#### Prior focus on ontology causes paralysis – having “good enough knowledge” is a sufficient condition for action.

Kratochwil, professor of international relations at the European University Institute, ‘8

[Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213]

The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The following ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” someone, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

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#### Empiricism works for IR – we can understand how states work.

Walt, ‘5 – Prof, Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard (Stephen M., Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:23–48, **pg. 25-26,** “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” http://www.iheid.ch/webdav/site/political\_science/shared/political\_science/3452/walt.pdf)

**Policy decisions can be influenced by several types of knowledge. First, policy makers invariably rely on purely factual knowledge** (e.g., how large are the opponent’s forces? What is the current balance of payments?). **Second, decision makers sometimes employ “rules of thumb”: simple decision rules acquired through experience rather than via systematic study** (Mearsheimer 1989).3 A third type of knowledge consists of typologies, which classify phenomena based on sets of specific traits. **Policy makers can also rely on empirical laws. An empirical law is an observed correspondence between two or more phenomena that systematic inquiry has shown to be reliable. Such laws** (**e.g., “democracies do not fight each other” or “human beings are more risk averse with respect to losses than to gains”**)

 **can be useful guides even if we do not know why they occur, or if our explanations for them are incorrect. Finally, policy makers can also use theories. A theory is a causal explanation— it identifies recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains. By providing us with a picture of the central forces that determine real-world behavior, theories invariably simplify reality in order to render it comprehensible. At the most general level, theoretical IR work consists of “efforts by social scientists. . .to account for interstate and trans-state processes, issues, and outcomes in general causal terms”** (Lepgold & Nincic 2001, p. 5; Viotti & Kauppi 1993). **IR theories offer explanations for the level of security competition between states (including both the likelihood of war among particular states and the warproneness of specific countries); the level and forms of international cooperation (e.g., alliances, regimes, openness to trade and investment); the spread of ideas, norms, and institutions; and the transformation of particular international systems, among other topics.** **In constructing these theories, IR scholars employ an equally diverse set of explanatory variables.** Some of these theories operate at the level of the international system, using variables such as the distribution of power among states (Waltz 1979, Copeland 2000, Mearsheimer 2001), the volume of trade, financial flows, and interstate communications (Deutsch 1969, Ruggie 1983, Rosecrance 1986); or the degree of institutionalization among states (Keohane 1984, Keohane & Martin 2003). Other theories emphasize different national characteristics, such as regime type (Andreski 1980, Doyle 1986, Fearon 1994, Russett 1995), bureaucratic and organizational politics (Allison & Halperin 1972, Halperin 1972), or domestic cohesion (Levy 1989); or the content of particular ideas or doctrines (Van Evera 1984, Hall 1989, Goldstein & Keohane 1993, Snyder 1993). Yet another family of theories operates at the individual level, focusing on individual or group psychology, gender differences, and other human traits (De Rivera 1968, Jervis 1976, Mercer 1996, Byman&Pollock 2001, Goldgeier&Tetlock 2001, Tickner 2001, Goldstein 2003), while a fourth body of theory focuses on collective ideas, identities, and social discourse (e.g., Finnemore 1996, Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999). **To develop these ideas, IR theorists employ the full range of social science methods: comparative case studies, formal theory, large-N statistical analysis, and hermeneutical or interpretivist approaches.**